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ABSTRACT:  Using representative individual-level data from the first round of the 
European Social Survey fielded in 2002/03, this paper provides an empirical 
analysis of unionization in 18 countries of the European Union. We show that 
union density varies considerably in Europe, ranging from 84 per cent in Denmark 
to 11 per cent in Portugal. Estimating identical models for each country, we find 
that individuals’ probability of union membership is significantly affected by their 
personal characteristics, their attitudes and the characteristics of their workplace, 
whereas social factors seem to play a minor role. The presence of a union at the 
workplace and employees’ attitudes concerning strong unions are the two 
variables with the most wide-spread effects on unionization. 
 
ZUSAMMENFASSUNG: Unter Verwendung von repräsentativen Individualdaten aus 
der ersten Runde des 2002/03 durchgeführten European Social Survey liefert 
dieser Beitrag eine empirische Analyse der Gewerkschaftsmitgliedschaft in 18 
Ländern der Europäischen Union. Wir zeigen, dass der gewerkschaftliche 
Organisationsgrad in Europa deutlich variiert, und zwar von 84 Prozent in 
Dänemark bis zu 11 Prozent in Portugal. Durch Schätzung gleicher Modelle für 
jedes Land finden wir heraus, dass die individuelle Wahrscheinlichkeit einer 
gewerkschaftlichen Mitgliedschaft signifikant von persönlichen Merkmalen, 
Einstellungen und Arbeitsplatzcharakteristiken abhängt, während soziale Faktoren 
eine geringe Rolle zu spielen scheinen. Die Anwesenheit einer Gewerkschaft am 
Arbeitsplatz und die Einstellungen der Beschäftigten zu starken Gewerkschaften 
sind die beiden Variablen, deren Auswirkungen auf die Mitgliedschaft am 
weitesten verbreiteten sind. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
In many western countries, trade unions find it more and more difficult to attract 
and to keep members. Calculations by Visser (2003) show that between 1985 and 
1997 aggregate union membership in the European Union (EU 15) fell by 8 per 
cent and aggregate union density by about 8 percentage points.
1 However, these 
aggregate trends (also identified by Checchi and Lucifora 2002) mask substantial 
differences between countries. While in some countries unions have experienced 
decline, in others they have been able to grow. The levels of union density also 
differ markedly between countries in Europe. These differences matter because 
they may influence the political and economic power of unions in their home 
countries as well as at EU level. 
 
There exists a substantial empirical literature on the determinants of union 
membership and density which uses aggregate time-series analyses as well as 
individual-level cross-sectional analyses (see the surveys by Riley 1997 and 
Schnabel 2003). However, most of these studies concentrate on a single country.
2 
Cross-national variations in unionization have been analyzed in a few studies that 
make use of three empirical approaches: They either provide cross-sectional 
estimations of union density across industrialized countries at a certain date (see, 
for example, Western 1997, Ebbinghaus and Visser 1999), they compare changes 
in union membership or density in these countries over time (Ebbinghaus and 
Visser 1999, Blaschke 2000, Visser 2002), or they analyze a pooled time-series 
cross-section panel data set (Calmfors et al. 2001, Checchi and Visser 2001, 
Checchi and Lucifora 2002). The main focus of most of these cross-national 
studies is on institutional factors (such as union-affiliated unemployment insurance 
and workplace representation) or on structural change, and all of them use 
aggregate data. 
 
To the best of our knowledge, however, no study seems to exist that makes use of 
similar individual-level data of employees in several countries and that estimates 
identical models of union membership (and calculates union density figures) for 
these countries. This paper attempts to fill this gap in the literature by using a new 
large-scale data set for European countries, the European Social Survey. It will be 
                                            
1    Similar trends can be found in North America, Oceania, and in the transition countries of 
Eastern Europe; see Visser (2003). 
2    A recent exception is the comparative analysis of youth-adult differences in unionization of 
American, British and Canadian workers by Bryson et al. (2005).   4
interesting to see whether the same (groups of) variables are able to explain union 
membership in different countries and which variables are most important for 
unionization. 
 
The structure of the paper is as follows: section  2 explains the data used and 
calculates union density figures for EU countries. A brief overview of various 
theoretical models from economics and social psychology that try to explain 
unionization is provided in section  3. Section  4 presents the results of our 
empirical investigation and identifies the main determinants of union membership 
in EU countries. The impact of key variables is simulated in section  5, and 
section 6 concludes. 
 
2. UNION DENSITY IN EU COUNTRIES 
Most of the existing figures on union density in Europe are based on membership 
data provided by the unions, although for some countries labour force surveys also 
offer some information (see Visser 2003, Lesch 2004). The data used in this study 
were taken from the first round of the European Social Survey (ESS) fielded in 
2002/03 (Jowell et al. 2003). This cross-section survey is covering 22 countries 
(Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Hungary, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, 
Portugal, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom). The 
universe are all persons aged 15 and above resident within private households, 
regardless of their nationality, citizenship, language or legal status. The survey 
involves strict random probability sampling, a minimum target response rate of 70 
per cent and rigorous translation protocols; data are collected in face-to-face 
interviews.
3 Given our focus on countries that are (or have recently become) 
members of the European Union we exclude Israel, Norway and Switzerland. 
Furthermore, we cannot use the data for the Czech Republic due to missing 
information on the union membership status. 
 
A great advantage of the ESS data for our effort lies in the ex-ante coordination of 
the questionnaire used among the teams involved in the various country surveys. 
Although the sample size varies considerably between countries (see Table 1), 
                                            
3   The data and information about the ESS are available from the ESS home site located at NSD – 
Norwegian Social Science Data Services (http://ess.nsd.uib.no).For our study we use version 
ESS1 edition 05.0 released June 17, 2004. To facilitate replication and extensions of our results 
the Stata do-files used are available on request from the second author.   5
these data should be a much better basis for cross-country comparisons than data 
from national sources. The interviewees were asked whether they were a member 
of a trade union at the time of the interview or in the last 12 months (see ESS 
question E3a for details). Those who answered this question in the affirmative are 
coded as union members.
4 Restricting the sample to employees only (and thus 
avoiding the problem that union figures usually also include data on retired and 
unemployed members) we are able to calculate (net) density rates defined as the 
percentage of union members among the employees in each country. 
 
(Table 1 about here) 
 
Table 1 presents information on union density available from our sample that is 
based on weighted data. As can be seen from the point estimates in the first 
column, in 2002/03 union density figures varied considerably in Europe, ranging 
from about 11 per cent in Portugal to almost 84 per cent in Denmark.
5 In general 
the Nordic countries record the highest union densities whereas the Mediterranean 
countries are at the bottom of the distribution. In many countries the point 
estimates of average density differ between men and women, but the 95 per cent 
confidence intervals are quite large and there is no clear picture across countries 
as to whether male or female employees are more likely to be union members. 
The same can be said for blue collar and white collar workers. This may be a bit 
surprising given the long-time belief that men and blue collar workers are the 
backbone of the unions, and it will be interesting to see whether similar effects 
also show up in multivariate analyses. 
 
3. THEORETICAL EXPLANATIONS OF UNION MEMBERSHIP 
Union membership and its determinants have been studied from various 
perspectives by economists, sociologists, psychologists and political scientists 
(see Schnabel 2003 for a recent survey), and it has proved difficult or even 
impossible to identify a standard model of unionization. The traditional economic 
approach has analyzed the forces that influence union membership within a 
                                            
4   Note that in question F28 the interviewees were asked “Are you or have you ever been a 
member of a trade union or similar organization?“, and one category is “Yes, currently”. 
However, given that we do not know what the interviewees consider as a “similar organization” 
we did not use the information based on this question. 
5   The figures in Table 1 are reasonably close to those based on labour force surveys for a few 
countries in 1997-99 presented by Visser (2003). They differ in an unsystematic way from the 
figures presented by Visser (2003) and by Lesch (2004) that were calculated from other data 
using different methods.   6
conventional framework of demand and supply which can be traced back to 
Berkowitz (1954) and Pencavel (1971). Union membership is considered as 
though it were an asset in the portfolio of a utility-maximizing worker that provides 
a flow of services, which are private and/or collective goods. Demand for union 
membership depends negatively on its costs relative to the price of other goods 
and assets, whereas income or wealth should influence union membership 
positively if union services are a normal good. The larger the monetary and non-
monetary benefits of union representation are, the more likely are employees to 
join a union. In contrast, the lower the cost of substitute services (such as social 
welfare benefits), the lower demand for union services should be. Finally, 
individuals’ taste for unionism can affect the demand for union membership. This 
variable is meant to reflect workers’ attitudes and preferences, ideological motives, 
social pressure and customs, and related non-economic variables stressed by 
other disciplines of social science. 
 
Although unions may not be typical profit maximizers, they face a binding budget 
constraint in that they must fund union organizing and services, which means that 
they must pay attention to revenues and (opportunity) costs. Therefore the supply 
of union services depends positively on revenues whereas the costs of union 
organizing and the costs of servicing existing members both affect supply 
negatively. Organizing and servicing costs are likely to have a fixed-cost 
component so that collective bargaining exhibits decreasing unit costs with respect 
to membership, and unionism is therefore less likely in small firms. Both the costs 
of organizing and of servicing will be affected by employers’ attitudes toward 
unions and collective bargaining, and they can be influenced substantially by the 
legal structure within which unions may operate. Furthermore union goals (such as 
maximizing membership or a certain utility function) may affect the supply of union 
services in various ways. 
 
Empirical studies generally estimate some variant of a reduced-form equation 
combining the supply and demand functions. Since most of the variables sketched 
above cannot be measured directly, they are often substituted for by proxy 
variables (such as firm size, industry affiliation and personal characteristics). 
However, these variables are likely to affect unionism through more than one 
channel, so that interpretation is difficult. In addition to measurement problems in 
the explanatory variables of the reduced-form equation, the amount of union 
services is also not directly observed. Assuming that the level of services is 
proportional to the level of unionization, direct measures of union membership, 
union density or bargaining coverage can be used to proxy union services.   7
A major problem of this sort of cost-benefit analysis is that it does not pay enough 
attention to an important challenge trade unions face in most countries, namely the 
free-rider problem. Many of the services unions provide – such as higher wages 
and better working conditions – accrue both to union members and non-members 
in the workplace. These services can be seen as public or collective goods since 
they are non-rival in consumption, and low-cost exclusion of non-members is not 
possible. Hence an individual has a free-rider incentive not to join the union. The 
key problem for economists is to explain why any individual would join a union 
when dues are costly and when the benefits apply to all workers regardless of their 
union status. 
 
A prominent explanation of why large groups providing collective goods such as 
trade unions manage to exist despite the free-rider problem stems from Olson 
(1965) who argued that a large group can only have formed for two reasons: 
Either because membership is compulsory or because the group offers selective 
incentives in the form of private goods and services available only to its members 
(with ancillary provision of the collective good as a “byproduct“). As regards 
unions, Olson (1965: 75) thought that “[i]n most cases it is compulsory 
membership and coercive picket lines that are the source of the union’s 
membership“. In European countries, however, “closed shops” (in which union 
membership is a condition of employment) are either illegal or are rarely found 
anymore, and the widespread presence of “open shop“ unions (where 
membership is voluntary) suggests that selective incentives such as strike pay and 
legal support available to members may be more important for joining a union.
6 
 
In addition to such material selective incentives, Booth (1985) has suggested to 
interpret the incentive private good as being the “reputation“ utility that derives 
from complying with a social custom of union membership. This idea stems from 
Akerlof (1980) and takes up an argument commonly put forward by sociologists 
and psychologists, namely that within a community there is a set of rules and 
customs that are obeyed by individuals because of the sanction of a loss of 
reputation if the custom should be disobeyed. In the context of union membership, 
the social custom can be thought of as urging workers not to free-ride. Following 
                                            
6   Booth and Chatterji (1995) develop a theoretical model of the simultaneous determination of 
union wages and membership which points to the existence of excludable private goods such 
as grievance procedures, influence over manning arrangements or representation by the union 
as an important factor motivating workers to join unions in the absence of coercive closed shop 
rules. In models by Moreton (1998) and by Jones and McKenna (1994) greater job security for 
union members acts as a selective incentive to join the union. Bulkley and Myles (2001) argue 
that joining a union instead of free-riding may be rational if it enables individuals to influence 
union bargaining goals and thus their own employment probability.   8
social custom theory, Booth (1985) and Naylor (1990) have proposed models in 
which it is assumed that workers directly derive utility from the reputation effect of 
belonging to a union, and which show that a union can exist despite the free-rider 
problem if it achieves a minimum critical density. In the social custom approach, 
the decision to join is interdependent and – contrary to the Olson (1965) free-rider 
paradox – workers may be more prepared to join a union if others are joining.
7 
 
Within this framework, Naylor and Cripps (1993) have shown that when workers’ 
tastes are heterogeneous with respect to their sensitivity to reputation, stable 
intermediate union density is a possible equilibrium outcome. They provide an 
explanation of voluntary membership of the open shop trade union in which the 
union density level is likely to increase as a result of a reduction in union 
membership costs, an increase in strike pay or an increase in individuals’ 
sensitivity to the social custom of union membership and the associated solidarity 
effects.
8 Furthermore, Booth and Chatterji (1993) have provided a model of union 
membership and wage determination which predicts that the open shop union is 
viable only after membership has achieved a minimum critical density, and wages 
are at a sufficient level to support this. 
 
Social custom models indicate that in addition to pure economic reasoning, social 
and psychological factors may also contribute to explaining the level and 
development of union membership. Within the social psychology, four theoretical 
and partly overlapping approaches to trade union participation can be 
distinguished, namely frustration-aggression theory, attribution theory, rational-




The frustration-aggression approach explains union membership as a result of 
individuals’ frustration, dissatisfaction or alienation in their work situation (and 
membership resignation in terms of frustration with union policies). However, 
                                            
7   Naylor (1990) demonstrates the formal equivalence of the Booth (1985) model and the “critical 
mass“ or “tipping“ models developed by Schelling (1978); see also the “resource mobilization“ 
approach by Klandermans (1984). 
8    Extensions of the social custom model taking into account employer behaviour have been 
proposed by Naylor and Raaum (1993) and by Corneo (1995). They show that a stable long-run 
equilibrium may exist, in which strong unions persist in spite of management opposition. 
9   A short overview of psychological and socio-political theories of union membership and 
participation can also be found in Guest and Dewe (1988). Earlier contributions from 
sociologists and political scientists – stressing the importance of factors such as class 
consciousness, values, modes of production, the composition of the workforce, the political 
climate, the role of government incomes policies, and the centralisation and cohesiveness of the 
labour movement – include Streeck (1981) and Beyme (1981).   9
dissatisfaction “is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for participation” 
(Klandermans 1986: 199). Attribution theory deals with the ways in which people 
try to explain events in their own social environment (see, e.g., Kelley and Michela 
1980). People are assumed to make judgements about the causes or reasons of 
events or individuals’ behaviour, and these explanations (“attributions”) have 
consequences for their future behaviour. If, for instance, problems at the 
workplace are attributed to external (i.e. non-personal) but controllable factors, 
collective action and union participation may be one consequence. 
 
Rational-choice theory interprets unionization as the outcome of a process of 
weighing the costs and benefits of participation (a prominent example is Crouch 
1982). Of course, such an approach also underlies economic theories of 
unionization, but economists often pay attention only to individual, selective costs 
and benefits (without asking whether the actors really perceive the underlying net 
benefit). In contrast, social scientists try to take a broader view and point out that 
the unionization decision can also be influenced by collective, social and 
ideological motives, which may be difficult to measure. The balance of perceived 
costs and benefits, combined with expectations about the degree to which the 
union will be able to realize these motives, determine the actual decision to be a 
union member. 
 
In the interactionist approach union participation is inextricably bound up with 
group culture, and an individual’s decision to join a union is strongly influenced by 
his social context, i.e. his living and working environment (see also social identity 
theory, e.g. Tajfel 1982). Concerning the working environment, the prevailing 
union density in an individual’s establishment or industry and the contact with the 
union at the workplace may play a role. Concerning the living environment, 
tradition and prevailing opinions within someone’s group are important because 
here general beliefs are formed about unions even before the employment 
relationship is entered into. Starting with Booth (1985) this line of reasoning has 
been incorporated into the social custom models of union membership discussed 
above which in some sense blend interactionist and rational-choice explanations. 
 
To a certain degree, social scientists provide other explanations or emphasize 
different determinants of unionization than economists. Some of these factors can 
be incorporated in the economist’s supply-demand and cost-benefit framework 
discussed above whereas others are more difficult to operationalize. Empirical 
studies of the determinants of union membership usually take an eclectic 
approach and combine economic as well as socio-political hypotheses and   10
explanations. Surveys of the international empirical evidence are provided, inter 
alia, by Chaison and Rose (1991), Wheeler and McClendon (1991), Riley (1997) 
and Schnabel (2003). They show that according to time-series studies business 
cycle factors and structural developments play a significant role in explaining union 
membership trends and that cross-sectional analyzes at the level of individuals 
have identified a number of personal, occupational and firm characteristics, 
attitudes and social variables which are associated with the unionization decision 
in different countries. While time-series analysis is not feasible since our data 
cover just one wave of the ESS, the latter approach will be pursued now. 
 
4. EMPIRICAL ANALYSES OF THE FACTORS ASSOCIATED  
WITH UNION MEMBERSHIP 
The ESS data described in section 2 allow us to investigate the factors associated 
with union membership because they include information on a number of potential 
covariates such as personal and occupational characteristics, family background, 
attitudes, and union organization at the workplace. They can be used to estimate 
identically specified empirical models for each of the 18 countries included in our 
study and they should provide a much better basis for cross-country comparisons 
than data from national surveys. Since the dependent variable in our investigation 
is a 1/0-dummy variable indicating whether an employee is a union member or not, 
a probit analysis (estimating the probability of union membership) is appropriate. 
 
The explanatory variables used are listed and grouped in Table 2. The first group 
of variables contains a number of personal characteristics such as gender, age, 
education and occupation that have been found to be systematically related to 
union membership in cross-sectional studies in many countries (see the surveys 
by Riley 1997 and Schnabel 2003). The descriptive statistics in Table 1 show that 
in 10 of the 18 countries investigated the union density of men is higher than that 
of women. This difference has traditionally been interpreted as a reflection of 
men’s greater degree of attachment to the labour force which would increase the 
benefits of unionization both from the point of view of employees and of unions.
10 A 
similar cost-benefit reasoning applies to full-time workers, so that we include 
dummy variables for gender and full-time working in the analysis. The 
occupational status of employees is represented by a dummy variable for blue 
                                            
10   Visser (2003: 397), however, notes that “since the early 1980s, nearly all of the growth in 
membership in EU unions has come from women” and that “the gender gap in unionization is 
narrowing”, so that this traditional hypothesis may not hold anymore.   11
collar workers. Economic and rational-choice considerations predict that blue 
collar workers should have a higher probability of being union members since they 
have rather homogeneous preferences and working conditions which make them 
easier to organize than white collar workers. Interestingly, however, according to 
the descriptive evidence in Table 1 only in 9 of the 18 countries investigated union 
density is higher for blue collar workers, whereas in the other 9 countries it is 
lower. 
 
An age variable is included in the analysis in order to test the hypothesis that 
younger workers are less likely to be union members due to their different 
socialization resulting in lower identification with unions. Since the relationship 
between age and unionization might be concave (increasing at a decreasing rate 
and possibly falling at the end), we include both age and its square in our 
estimations. We further employ two dummy variables that take on the value of 1 if 
employees’ highest educational level completed is below the upper secondary 
level and if they have completed the second stage of tertiary education, 
respectively. For both groups of lowly and highly educated employees we expect a 
lower probability of unionization than for our reference group with medium-level 
education because recruitment costs should be higher for these groups than for 
the (rather homogeneous) group of skilled workers traditionally represented by the 
trade unions. Furthermore, more educated employees usually have greater 
individual bargaining power (and thus a lesser need for collective voice), and 
sometimes they identify more with management than with the labour movement. 
Lowly skilled workers may be more union-friendly, but since they often experience 
a higher labour market fluctuation, neither they nor the unions might be very much 
interested in membership. We also include a dummy variable for native employees 
that takes on the value of 1 if the individual was born in the country analyzed. We 
do not have clear-cut theoretical priors in this case (and international results for 
race and nationality are quite mixed, see Schnabel 2003), but it might be 
interesting to see whether foreigners are as likely to be union members as native 
employees. 
 
The second group of variables reflects some characteristics of the workplace that 
have been found to influence unionization in a number of studies (reviewed by 
Riley 1997 and Schnabel 2003). We include four dummy variables for 
establishment size intervals that are above our reference group of establishments 
with less than ten employees. We expect the probability of union membership to 
rise with establishment size because union costs of recruiting and organizing 
should be lower in larger units. In addition, union services may be valued most   12
highly in large, bureaucratic organizations where workers are likely to be treated 
impersonally and feel a greater need for representation and protection. We also 
have information on whether there is a trade union at the workplace. If this is the 
case, it can be expected to increase an employee’s likelihood of being a union 
member for at least three reasons: First, union representatives at the workplace 
have direct access to the employees, which facilitates recruiting efforts. Second, 
and related, union membership may be an experience good (Bryson and Gomez 
2003). Third, there may be higher peer pressure to conform to a social custom of 
union membership. Finally, we have constructed an index reflecting employees’ 
freedom or influence at work that increases with the amount of control an 
employee can exert on his working environment.
11 We expect a negative 
relationship with unionization since employees that have more influence and 
freedom at work should have lesser need for collective voice. 
 
Employees’ political, social and religious attitudes form a third group of 
explanatory variables that have been found to be related to unionization in many 
studies (see the survey by Riley 1997). The ESS data contain information on the 
political orientation of respondents measured on an 11-point scale ranging from 0 
for left to 10 for right. The socialist roots of the labour movement in many countries 
suggest that left-wing views should be associated with a higher probability of union 
membership (which would imply a negative coefficient of this variable in our 
estimations), but in other countries (parts of) union movements have different 
political affiliations, so that the outcome is really an empirical matter. Employees 
were also asked to express their satisfaction with the way things are handled at 
the workplace in the last 12 months on an 11-point scale ranging from 0 for 
extremely dissatisfied to 10 for extremely satisfied. According to frustration-
aggression theory we should expect a negative coefficient of this variable since 
dissatisfied employees are assumed to have a stronger desire for unionization and 
may be more likely to unionize. A further question asked respondents whether 
they thought that employees needed strong trade unions to protect work 
conditions and wages, offering a 5-point scale of agreement. Since our (recoded) 
index rises with the extent of agreement, we expect a positive association with the 
probability of union membership. Although we have no clear-cut theoretical priors, 
we also include information on whether an employee is a member of a church in 
                                            
11  In the ESS, employees were asked to assess (on an 11-point scale) the extent to which they 
are allowed to a) be flexible in working hours, b) decide how daily work is organized, c) 
influence the job environment, d) influence decisions about the work direction, and e) change 
work tasks. By simply summing up the answers to these five questions we constructed an index 
of freedom at the workplace that ranges from 0 (no influence) to 50 (complete control).   13




The fourth and final group of variables is meant to reflect social factors such as the 
influence of reference groups and key individuals on the decision maker. 
Unfortunately the ESS data set does not contain information on whether an 
employee’s spouse or his parents were union members or blue collar workers. 
There is, however, some information on the educational level achieved by the 
respondent’s parents, so that we can construct two dummy variables taking on the 
value of 1 if the father or the mother has a low level of education. While these 
dummy variables should play no role in a purely economic reasoning, according to 
social custom theory and to the interactionist approach they can be expected to 
have a positive influence on the probability of union membership due to a union-
friendly socialization process in the family. The opposite might be the case, 
however, if the respondent’s parents were self-employed. We take this into 
account by including a dummy variable that takes on the value of 1 if the father or 
the mother was self-employed when the respondent was 14 years old. 
 
(Table 2 about here) 
 
Table 2 presents the results of estimating identical models with the explanatory 
variables described above for all 18 countries. It concentrates on the signs of 
estimated coefficients that are statistically significant at the 5 (10) per cent level; 
detailed estimation results for all countries are documented in an Appendix Table. 
From Table 2 it can be seen that our model does not perform equally well in each 
country and that the same covariates have rather different explanatory power 
across countries (in some cases even changing signs between countries). This is 
not surprising given the substantial differences between countries concerning the 
labour movement, the political and social system, traditions and history, the stage 
of economic development and the current economic situation. Despite these 
differences some interesting insights about the importance of some (groups of) 
explanatory variables and their relevance in certain (groups of) countries can be 
obtained. 
 
While it is not possible to discuss the significance or insignificance of each 
covariate in each country, it seems to be promising to look at the four groups of 
explanatory variables identified above and assess their relevance for explaining 
                                            
12  For a recent comparative study analyzing the complex relationship between church attendance 
and union membership see Gomez, Lipset and Meltz (2001).   14
union membership. Formally this is done by conducting Wald tests on the joint 
statistical significance of each group of variables in each country. The prob-values 
of these tests are presented in Table 3, and together with the significance of single 
variables reported in Table 2 they enable us to draw some conclusions on the 
(relative) importance of various characteristics. 
 
(Table 3 about here) 
 
From Table 3 it can be seen that personal characteristics play a significant role in 
explaining union membership in 12 of the 18 countries studied. The relative 
importance of individual characteristics, however, varies considerably between 
countries, and there is not one country in which all the personal characteristics 
included in the model prove to be significant (see Table 2). Usually the signs of the 
estimated coefficients are as expected, but in some countries males do not have a 
higher but a significantly lower probability of being a union member than females. 
Varying signs are also obtained for natives’ probability of unionization. 
 
Workplace characteristics are highly significant determinants of unionization in 16 
of the 18 countries studied (and are weakly significant in a seventeenth country, 
see Table 3). The most important variable in this group and overall seems to be 
the presence of a trade union at the workplace which makes it easier to recruit, 
serve and keep members. In all 18 countries the probability of union membership 
is significantly higher if there is a union at the workplace (see Table 2).
13 At first 
sight, the size of an establishment does not seem to play a role for unionization, 
which would be in stark contrast to previous findings. However, it can be assumed 
that due to scale effects in recruiting and organizing the presence of a union is not 
independent of establishment size.
14 For each country we therefore estimated a 
second variant of the model excluding union presence at the workplace. The 
results are documented in the Appendix Table and they show that now 
establishment size plays a significant role in explaining membership in the majority 
of countries. 
 
Employees’  attitudes make a significant contribution to explaining union 
membership in 12 of the 18 countries studied. While a left-wing political 
                                            
13  This finding is consistent with a number of previous cross-national studies using aggregate data 
that find positive effects of workplace representation (rights) on union density; see, e.g., Hancké 
(1993), Ebbinghaus and Visser (1999), Checchi and Visser (2001) and Checchi and Lucifora 
(2002). 
14  A simple probit analysis not documented here shows that the probability of union presence at 
the workplace significantly increases with establishment size in each country.   15
orientation, dissatisfaction with the way things are handled at work and being a 
church member significantly increase the probability of union membership in only a 
few countries, an individual’s attitude towards strong unions proves to be 
significant in most countries. The stronger workers agree that employees need 
strong trade unions to protect work conditions and wages the more likely they are 
to be union members. An interesting exception to this rule is found in the former 
communist countries of eastern Europe (i.e. Hungary, Poland, Slovenia) where in 
the past unions used to be state-controlled mass organizations and where the 
labour movement is now often divided between anti-communist, post-communist 
and other unions. 
 
Quite in contrast to the other groups of variables, the social factors included in our 
study do not play a significant role in explaining union membership in most 
countries (see Table 3). This result does not necessarily imply that social factors 
and social customs are not important for unionization. It may well reflect a lack of 
better data, since information on the union status of a respondent’s spouse or 
parents and other likely determinants is not available in the ESS data set. The 
potential importance of family background and socialization is underscored by the 
result that in five countries the experience of self-employment of the father or the 
mother is associated with a more or less significant reduction in the probability of 
union membership (see Table 2). 
 
In addition to these four groups of variables studied, institutional factors can 
influence unionization. A prominent example is the union-administered 
unemployment insurance found in Belgium, Denmark, Finland and Sweden, the 
so-called Ghent system, which may exert a positive influence on the recruitment 
and retention of union members. Empirical tests of this hypothesis have 
consistently found that the presence of a union-managed unemployment 
insurance is an important determinant of cross-national differences in union 
density (see, e.g., Western 1997, Ebbinghaus and Visser 1999, Blaschke 2000, 
Checchi and Lucifora 2002). While a formal test of this hypothesis is not possible 
with our data on individuals, Table 1 confirms that union density of employees in 
these four countries is among the highest in the European Union,
15 and an 
additional descriptive analysis not reported here indicates that union density of the 
unemployed is by far the highest in the Ghent countries. The Appendix Table also 
shows that establishment size does not play a significant role for union 
membership in these four countries (even if the significant variable indicating the 
                                            
15  To be more precise, Denmark, Sweden and Finland record the highest union densities while 
Belgium is ranked fifth, a little bit behind Slovenia.   16
workplace presence of a union is removed). This could reflect the possibility that 
union recruiting is different is these countries where the administration of the 
unemployment insurance system by union officials may be a quasi-selective 
incentive for workers to become union members, and the regular contact with the 
union during spells of unemployment may induce them to stay in the union. 
 
5. SIMULATING THE IMPACT OF KEY VARIABLES 
Up to now our discussion has devolved on issues of the statistical significance of 
the estimated coefficients and the directional influence of the covariates. The 
probit estimations presented in Table 2 have identified two variables that seem to 
have an important and wide-spread effect on unionization in almost all EU 
countries, namely the presence of a union at the workplace and employees’ 
attitudes concerning strong unions. Even more important than the statistical 
significance of these determinants may be their economic (and political) 
significance, i.e. the magnitude of their effects. Only if these two significant 
variables have a material impact on the probability of union membership, they can 
be used as strategic instruments by unions intending to increase their 
membership. 
 
Unfortunately, the estimated coefficients from a probit model (or any other non-
linear model) cannot easily be used to make statements about the size of the 
ceteris paribus effect of a change in the value of an exogenous variable (such as 
the presence or absence of a union at the workplace) on the value of the 
endogenous variable. This is because the size of the effect depends on both the 
starting level of the exogenous variable under consideration and on the values of 
all other variables in the model (see Long and Freese 2001: 87ff.). One way to 
ease interpretation of the estimates is to compute the estimated values of the 
endogenous variable (the probability of being a union member) for a person with 
certain characteristics and then to simulate how a change in the value of one 
exogenous variable (such as a union being present or not at the workplace) 
changes the estimated probability. The results of such simulations for the two 
explanatory variables mentioned above are shown in Table 4. 
 
(Table 4 about here) 
 
As a point of reference, the first column in Table  4 presents the estimated 
probability of union membership for a hypothetical individual A whose   17
characteristics are set equal to the sample means of all the explanatory variables 
in the empirical model for the corresponding country.
16 Leaving the values of the 
other explanatory variables unchanged, the next two columns illustrate the effects 
of union presence at the workplace by simulating the probability of being a union 
member for an individual B working in an establishment without unions and for a 
similar individual C who reports that there is a union at the workplace. The 
difference between the membership probabilities of individuals B and C can be 
interpreted as the effect of union presence at the workplace, ceteris paribus. To 
make just one example, the simulations show that in Austria the probability of 
being a union member increases from 9.7 to 44.4 per cent if there is a union at the 
workplace. Substantial effects of this sort are found in almost every country 
investigated, and they are particularly high in Ireland, Slovenia and the United 
Kingdom. 
 
The last two columns illustrate the effects of individuals’ attitudes towards unions 
by simulating the probability of being a union member for an individual D who does 
not believe that employees need strong unions and for a similar individual E who 
believes in strong unions. Again taking Austria as an example, the simulations 
show that the probability of being a union member increases from 4.0 to 45.2 per 
cent if an individual fully agrees that employees need strong unions. In the majority 
of countries similar effects of substantial magnitude are found. Taken together 
these simulations imply that it may be worthwhile for unions to strengthen their 




Using representative individual-level data from the first round of the European 
Social Survey (ESS) fielded in 2002/03, this paper provided an empirical analysis 
of unionization in 18 countries of the European Union. We showed that union 
density varies considerably in Europe, ranging from almost 84 per cent in 
Denmark to just 11 per cent in Portugal. In most countries, individuals’ probability 
of union membership is significantly affected by their personal characteristics, their 
attitudes and the characteristics of their workplace, whereas social factors seem to 
play a minor role. 
                                            
16  It should be noted that these estimates differ from the union densities calculated in Table 1 
because they are based on unweighted data and on a smaller number of cases (due to missing 
values in some of the explanatory variables).   18
 
We identified the presence of a union at the workplace and employees’ attitudes 
concerning strong unions as the two variables that have the most wide-spread 
(and also quite substantial) effects on the probability of being a union member. 
This implies that unions which want to grow should increase their presence at the 
workplace. In addition to such a recruitment strategy, a public relations strategy for 
improving employees’ attitudes towards unions could also be helpful (although 
changing norms and attitudes is usually a very difficult and long-term task). 
Moreover, it may be no coincidence that the three countries with the highest union 
density (namely Denmark, Sweden and Finland) all have a union-administered 
unemployment insurance and that in these countries women’s probability of union 
membership is higher than that of men. These observations point to further union 
recruitment strategies. 
 
Our empirical findings do not enable us to discriminate between alternative (but 
often related) theories from economics and social psychology. For example, the 
impact of union presence at the workplace, the most important explanatory 
variable identified, is consistent with a traditional economic explanation (i.e. cost-
benefit considerations on the sides of employees and unions), with rational-choice 
theory, with an interactionist explanation and with social custom theory. We are 
also aware of the problem that cross-sectional analyses can only detect 
correlations between variables and are not able to answer questions of causality. 
While we have been able to identify some factors associated with differences in 
union density and the probability of union membership, there may be other 
relevant factors such as national traditions, the history and current shape of the 
labour movement or individuals’ work life experience that could not be taken into 
account because they are difficult to measure or because corresponding data are 
not available. 
 
Due to lack of data we also could not investigate the process of joining or leaving a 
union. For this and for some of the problems mentioned above, panel data would 
be helpful, but unfortunately the European Social Survey (which has been fielded 
again in 2004) is not constructed as a panel. Nevertheless future waves of this 
survey may be helpful to see whether union densities and their determinants 
converge over time between groups of countries (as found for western and eastern 
Germany by Schnabel and Wagner 2003) and whether aggregate union 
membership and density in the European Union continue to fall.   19
Table 1:  Percentage of union members among employees in EU countries,  
        2002/2003 























































































































































































































Source:  Own computations based on data from the European Social Survey 2002/2003 (ESS1e05, 
released June 17
th, 2004) 
Note:  N = sample size used to calculate the figures reported in the column “All”; computations use 
weighted data; 95% confidence intervals reported in brackets. The samples include all 
respondents aged 15 to 64 who were employed (and neither self-employed nor in paid work) at 
the time interview. White collar workers are defined following the ILO International Standard 
Classification of Occupation (ISCO-88) as those with ISCO Nos. < 7000, blue collar workers as 
those with 7000 ≤ ISCO ≤ 9999.   20
Table  2:  Factors influencing the probability of union membership in 18 EU   

















gender (male = 1) 
age (in years) 
age squared 
low education (below upper 
secondary = 1) 
high education (second stage 
of tertiary = 1) 
native (born in country = 1) 
full-time worker (1 = yes) 
















































































































establishment size  
(intervals) 
• 10 to 24 employees 
• 25 to 99 employees 
• 100 to 499 employees 
• 500 or more employees 
union at workplace (1 = yes) 
extent of freedom at work 

















































































































(index: 0 = left, 10 = right) 
satisfaction with way things 
are handled at work (index) 
agree that employees need 
strong unions (index) 


















































































father’s level of education  
(low = 1) 
mother’s level of education 
(low = 1) 
father and/or mother self-
employed when respondent 





























































Note: The signs reported reflect those of the estimated coefficients that are statistically significant at the 5 per cent 
level or better; signs in bracket reflect a significance level of 10 per cent.   21
Table 2 (continued) 
 
 
Variables  expected 














gender (male = 1) 
age (in years) 
age squared 
low education (below upper 
secondary = 1) 
high education (second 
stage of territory = 1) 
native (born in country = 1) 
full-time worker (1 = yes) 

















































































































establishment size  
(intervals) 
• 10 to 24 employees 
• 25 to 99 employees 
• 100 to 499 employees 
• 500 or more employees 
union at workplace (1 = 
yes) 
extent of freedom at work 











































































































(index: 0 = left, 10 = right) 
satisfaction with way things 
are handled at work (index) 
agree that employees need 
strong unions (index) 



















































































father’s level of education      
(low = 1) 
mother’s level of education    
(low = 1) 
father and/or mother self-
employed when respondent 





























































   22
Table  3: Significance of groups of variables in explaining union   








Austria  0.314     0.000**     0.000**  0.113 
Belgium     0.000**  0.306     0.000**  0.836 
Denmark     0.000**  0.077     0.000**  0.593 
Finland     0.005**    0.012*     0.001**  0.150 
France     0.001**     0.000**     0.000**  0.468 
Germany     0.000**     0.000**     0.000**  0.560 
Greece  0.116     0.000**  0.440  0.130 
Hungary    0.041*     0.000**  0.535  0.236 
Ireland  0.105     0.000**     0.000**  0.693 
Italy  0.095     0.002**  0.179  0.448 
Luxembourg     0.007**     0.001**  0.108  0.314 
Netherlands     0.000**     0.000**     0.000**    0.035* 
Poland     0.000**     0.000**     0.000**  0.460 
Portugal  0.153     0.000**  0.074  0.303 
Slovenia     0.004**     0.000**  0.323  0.079 
Spain  0.299     0.000**     0.004**  0.856 
Sweden     0.000**     0.000**     0.000**     0.002** 
United 
Kingdom 
   0.000**     0.000**     0.000**  0.077 
Source: Own computations based on data from the European Social Survey 2002/2003 (ESS1e05, 
released June 17
th, 2004) and on the regression models in Table 2 and in the Appendix 
Table. 
Note:  Reported values are prob-values from Wald tests for the joint significance of variables in a 
group; if a prob-value is 0.050 (0.010) or less, the null hypothesis that the variables in the 
group have no impact on the probability of union membership is rejected at an error level of 
5 (1) per cent or smaller; for a quick look, * (**) denotes statistical significance at the 5 (1) 
per cent level.   23
Table  4: Simulated probabilities of union membership for various   
   individuals 
 
Country A  B  C  D  E 
Austria  28.2    9.7  44.4    4.0  45.2 
Belgium 43.8  (37.5) (47.3)  18.9  57.1 
Denmark 90.3  85.0 92.3 74.5 94.3 
Finland 72.6  59.2 75.0 54.2 77.0 
France    7.2    0.5  17.1    0.3  19.6 
Germany  17.8    6.9  35.2    3.9  30.5 
Greece    6.1    1.0  23.4  (5.0)  (6.3) 
Hungary    3.4    0.1  32.5  (1.9)  (3.9) 
Ireland  28.8    3.3  67.6    8.3  41.4 
Italy  15.0    5.1  22.3    3.3  21.2 
Luxembourg 37.3 25.3 45.7 (30.0)  (40.0) 
Netherlands  28.1    4.2  37.5    7.2  43.0 
Poland    3.8    0.2  32.8  (2.1)  (4.6) 
Portugal    5.8    2.2  19.2  (1.0)  (8.7) 
Slovenia  38.7    5.9  57.5 (30.7)  (40.7) 
Spain    8.0    3.0  20.6    0.4  14.1 
Sweden 85.0  63.9  87.4 41.5 93.4 
United Kingdom   19.0    3.7  53.1    3.0  36.4 
Source: Own computations based on data from the European Social Survey 2002/2003 (ESS1e05, 
released June 17
th, 2004) and on the regression models in Table 2 and in the Appendix 
Table. 
Note:  Reported values are the estimated probabilities of union membership (in per cent) of five 
hypothetical individuals A to E with the following varying characteristics: 
  Individual A: an employee for whom the values of the explanatory variables in the union 
membership function are set equal to the mean of the sample used for each country. 
  Individual B: same as A but working in an establishment where there is no union at the 
workplace 
  Individual C: same as A but working in an establishment where there is a union at the 
workplace 
  Individual D: same as A but disagrees strongly that employees need strong unions 
  Individual E: same as A but agrees strongly that employees need strong unions. 
  Values are put in brackets if the estimated coefficient of the explanatory variable used for 
the simulations B/C or D/E is not statistically significant at the 5 per cent level or better (see 
Table 2).   24
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